What President Eisenhower would do if he were mediating Ukraine-Russia negotiations today
BEYOND CEASEFIRES: Ukraine’s term sheet proposed on Monday – doubtless with significant input from US Special Envoy General Kellogg – is light-years away from where terms need to be to achieve fast Ukraine peace.
The terms are incredibly basic – still. And they lack meaningful detail (see: https://x.com/ChristopherJM/status/1929498190488678549/photo/1).
For example: still not ruling out Ukraine joining NATO, nor foreign troops being stationed in Ukraine. Mediators with any firm grasp would be forgiven for wishing to pack up their bags and go home. Terms do not address the “root causes” (from Russia’s perspective) at all.
General Kellogg says he thinks this term sheet is “pretty good”. Last week: “We’ll have what we call the E3. That is the National Security Advisors from Germany, France, and Great Britain... When we were in London, they kind of helped us mold a term sheet for Ukraine.”
But the term sheet’s authors appear subject to a fantasy, that getting Presidents together will magically solve immense divides – rather than themselves coming up with a creative plan to bridge the gap.
Diplomacy can succeed. I am strongly pro-diplomacy. But 130 days in, this is the Western term sheet?
Diplomacy is proceeding far too slowly. And President Trump is rightly frustrated with the slowness.
Prisoner exchanges are an important step, and to be commended. But with the actual term sheets, next to nothing has advanced.
The following is an alternative diplomatic plan…
One that’s much more defined than the Ukraine/Kellogg proposal from Monday…
“I decided to do something untraditional: propose a highly detailed plan and try to get both sides to react to it. Until both parties could react to a substantive plan, it seemed to me that they would keep fighting over vague concessions and hypothetical solutions, rather than coming to the table and negotiating a deal that would last long after it was signed and executed.” - Jared Kushner, Breaking History
That attempts to reconcile the two sides – giving upsides and meaningful incentives to both.
I’m rooting for President Trump’s peacemaking success. But figures close to President Trump need to decide: do they want to swing big, and try a daring outside-the-box approach to stop this awful war?
Or are they content with a conventional and staid approach, that (based on Monday’s documents) is on a path to inevitable failure – and the war dragging on violently and interminably?
The following is posted on X here: https://x.com/EdwardMDruce/status/1930144958314426754
Please like/retweet.
A year’s worth of thinking in one thread. Early praise:
1/ Three wacky new ideas that could save Ukraine diplomacy…
President Trump’s negotiating team are repeating the same sequencing error that Eisenhower made in his first four months in office (as new Republican President), while negotiating an end to the Korean War.
But Eisenhower “pivoted” his approach, and by 188 days into office, on July 27th, an Armistice was signed.
How did he do it?
• The following contains steps that President Trump’s negotiators have, to date, overlooked…
• How President Trump could still become the ultimate Peacemaker… 🕊️
2/ What President Eisenhower would do if he were mediating Ukraine-Russia negotiations today…
• Diplomacy in Korea succeeded while following a path of “fighting while talking”.
• President Rhee of South Korea didn’t “have the cards” either. Far from it.
• President Rhee (ally of the US) was, from the perspective of US officials “obsessed and irrational” and “capable of attempting to lead his country into national suicide”.
How did Eisenhower manage the situation?
• It wasn’t until Rhee was offered a security guarantee (the mutual defence treaty) that Rhee agreed to an armistice and robust territorial concessions – see below.
• It took President Eisenhower four months (right on cue with today) to come to terms with this – while threatening that the US would walk away. Eisenhower, with great reluctance, yielded to this realization, despite feeling like he was “surrendering to Rhee’s blackmail”.
A few short weeks later, peace was struck – that’s lasted for 72 years and counting.
• Zelensky will keep being “intransigent” (from an American perspective), without a credible security guarantee.
• To get an invaded country to go along with relinquishing territory (even “de facto” – to bring a war to heel), history indicates that you need to put a security guarantee in place first – or the President of the smaller, invaded country simply cannot go along with it.
3/ What could a credible “America First” security guarantee today look like?
How to:
• Enduringly secure Ukraine, so the conflict doesn’t recur;
• Without further provoking Russia – a plan Russia might agree to, that would simultaneously address the “root causes” of the conflict from Russia’s perspective;
• That could also work for President Trump’s America First administration…
The plan…
“FRUKUS”: an alliance of France, the United Kingdom, and – to begin – the United States. In the acronym, the US expressly comes last, with the US backstopping it for only seven years.
• All countries involved would provide an Article 5-strength guarantee to Ukraine (the territory Ukraine maintains behind a US-negotiated truce line) – with peacekeeping inside Ukraine managed by the UN.
• No NATO or European troops to be stationed in Ukraine.
• A restriction on long-range weaponry that can enter Ukraine. This is not “capitulating to Russia”. It’s exactly what Eisenhower enacted to end the Korean War. Emulate clause 13d of the Korean Armistice.
Encourage British and French energies instead be put into a new military base in east Poland: “Fort FRUK”.
• After seven years, US involvement sunsets, and Poland (which this year will spend a commendable 4.7% of GDP on defense) and Germany replace the US so “FRUKUS” (at inception: France/the UK/the US) becomes “Friends of Ukraine and the US”. At this seven-year juncture, Ukraine is also to lower its conscription age (presently at 25) to age 18 – to bolster collective European deterrence.
• If Ukraine were to attack Russia, the security guarantee would be voided; FRUKUS would not support Ukraine, and any false flag attack would leave Ukraine alone without allies.
If the Trump administration were to give assurances for such an Article 5-strength security guarantee to Ukraine first (to kick into effect immediately after an armistice), history, from the example of Eisenhower, suggests that the US can then push much harder on territorial concessions – which (regrettably) are necessary to end the bloodbath and prevent further escalation.
Is this undesirable for Ukraine? Of course.
Is it also the least-bad outcome from where we are today? YES. Ukraine and Europe are going to be in much worse shape if Russia’s summer offensive begins in earnest.
To US negotiators, I repeat: Eisenhower came to this realization with great reluctance, after four months of circular talks.
But it’s extremely unlikely the diplomatic gap can be bridged without it.
From Eisenhower’s example, a security guarantee coming first is the only sequencing that can lead to an agreement.
Combine the promise of a security guarantee for Ukraine with going much closer to Russia’s demands on territory, that are not going to budge.
All this is not suggested to get the US mired in Europe, but as a genuine off-ramp.
After seven years, US involvement in the FRUKUS security guarantee will sunset – leaving an Article 5-strength guarantee managed by Europe, freeing the US to focus squarely on China, and forcing Europe now to get its own defense readiness together.
Stabilize Europe while – medium-term on – being America First-compatible.
If the Trump administration is banking on warmer relations with Russia, and thinks, at least for the next few years, it can keep President Putin in check, the above ought not to be too great an ask.
4/ Territory – the contours of a way forward…
A crucial detail: in 1953, President Rhee of South Korea never personally signed the Armistice Agreement. He was sufficiently opposed to it, his military General had to do so.
Does the Ukrainian President today necessarily need to sign an armistice agreement?
Eight “carrots” that could bring peace, an altogether safer Europe, economic normalization with Russia, and a more stable global military picture with China:
1. A long-term solution for shared water management in Crimea, including joint reconstruction of the Kakhovka Dam. Elon Musk advanced the need for this in October 2022.
2. The US (and allies) to lift sanctions on Russia dating back to 2014. Not including Nord Stream 2 – that’s to remain closed, and should never have been allowed in the first place. But including Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project, and the option for Russia to return to SWIFT.
3. The US and Russia together to rejoin an updated version of the Open Skies Treaty. The Baltic countries want Russia – requiring the US – to rejoin, to have visibility of troop build-ups. This makes all of Europe safer.
4. The US to assist Russia with its satellite early-warning system, so it can see submarine missile launches from the North Sea (reducing the likelihood of a false alert – in global interests). A discovery here from MIT physics Professor Emeritus, Ted Postol, that could reset relations with Russia – yet nobody in the (non-scientific) mainstream is talking about it.
5. Revive the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, with the US and Russia together aiming to bring Beijing in as a signatory. President Trump in October 2018: “Let’s really get smart and let’s none of us develop those weapons.”
6. Refresh the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which is set to expire February 5, 2026 – working together to include China (in Russia’s interest as well as US) and hypersonic missiles.
7. Lift sanctions on Belarus, including restrictions on potash. A little-discussed incentive to get Russia’s closest ally on the side of US diplomats seeking peace.
8. A detailed Russia-EU-US discussion about wider security concerns in Europe.
For all eight “carrots”, agreement to form a new autonomous region in the territory Russia has taken since 2014.
5/ A new autonomous region…
John Hume, who won the Nobel Peace Prize for the Good Friday Agreement: “You can’t eat a flag.”
What to call the autonomous region?
• Question: What’s the 47th state?
Answer: New Mexico.
• Question: What does a map of the occupied territory in Ukraine look like?
A: With fresh eyes, minus Crimea, does it not look like an inverted California?
• Like 1850s California, the region has the potential to be re-founded with prosperity from mining.
• Also with fresh eyes – a bear and a star – does the California flag not look kinda Soviet?
If President Trump started saying that he wishes to turn eastern Ukraine into “New California”, could it inject new life into diplomatic talks – both in the media, and with each side?
I’m not suggesting that this becomes US administered territory. But rather, residents in the occupied territory encouraged either to assimilate or emigrate, being ensured a passport and citizenship in the place they choose to settle: Ukraine, Russia, or the new autonomous region. Separate voting rights for each.
This would (surely) be much easier for Ukraine to go along with.
• Name the autonomous region “New California”.
(This borrows from the DPR/LPR flags: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flags_used_in_Russian-occupied_Ukraine)
What better emblem for PROSPERITY, over war?
• The autonomous region to be internationally recognized.
Only 47 could this pull off.
6/ How to make the territory as prosperous as possible
And something to which the US could contribute mightily…
De-mine the territory at WARP SPEED.
• Ukraine is now the most heavily mined country in the world.
• Agricultural and food exports from Ukraine are estimated $8.9bn lower per year due to mines (affecting food security of lots of African countries).
• De-mining Ukraine is projected by think tanks (the Tony Blair Institute) to take ten+ years and cost $34bn. Adjusted for inflation, the Manhattan Project cost only $30bn over the course of World War II.
• This is arguably not thinking in an innovative way. The Trump administration could instead commission the most innovative US robotics companies: Gecko Robotics, Anduril, Boston Dynamics, Optimus/Tesla… and emulate the tender process of Operation Warp Speed.
• Use this as an opportunity to get US robotics supply chains in gear – which Marc Andreessen has warned of the urgent need for. Turn de-mining into a “treasure hunt”. Rather than leaving to NGOs, task the private sector, and de-mine the territory in a tenth of the time, at a tenth of the cost.
• De-mining at Warp Speed (and reviving Ukraine’s full agricultural yield) would unlock ~$55bn in economic value.
• The US taking responsibility for de-mining would produce massive gratitude towards President Trump, be internationally lauded (the Biden administration is partly responsible, having provided cluster munitions and American anti-personnel landmines), stimulate innovative US defense/robotics companies, and re-demonstrate to the world what US industry can do.
In exchange…
• Russia’s $300bn in frozen assets (with Russia’s permission – as part of the agreement) used to finance reconstruction of the territory.
• Ukraine relinquishes further monetary claims on Russia for damages during the war.
• Russia is to drop additional territorial claims where it argues referendums took place in territory Russia has never controlled.
7/ Then (with provisional agreement): 10x10 terms for a Rapid Ceasefire
• In public remarks, Russia insists that a ceasefire comes after a proposal that addresses the “root causes” (from their perspective) of the war.
• The below terms should get diplomatic teams close – vastly further than term sheets on Monday – balancing Russia’s requests with what Ukraine most urgently needs.
With these Armistice terms:
• Ukraine and Russia sign to confirm a ceasefire.
• Led by the Red Cross, the UAE and Belarus: the release of prisoners – all for all.
• Repatriate the bodies of the fallen.
• Ukraine agrees to end martial law, and swiftly (inside 100 days) hold a Presidential election.
8/ DEFINING “neutrality”
(As it has different meanings to all sides.)
To be specific:
• Ukraine will not join NATO. And will drop the aspiration for joining NATO from its constitution.
• Ukraine can become an “EU Bridge” member from Russia’s perspective (minus all future integrated defense elements: https://artofthedeal.org/ukraine/eu-bridge/ – restrictions also on agricultural funding, and attempting to agree fair terms with Hungary and other resistant EU member states).
• After the war, central and western Ukrainian sentiment is undoubtedly Western-leaning (https://news.gallup.com/poll/512360/ukrainians-future-west.aspx). But there should be sensible guardrails on how far the country as a whole is allowed to move in the direction of the West.
9/ Media talking points
Ensure enduring peace, rebuild European prosperity, and move on from this awful chapter…
• President Trump:
“We intend to offer Ukraine a real security guarantee, FRUKUS (France/the UK/the US), effective immediately.
Almost every analyst on February 24, 2022 thought Ukraine would be rolled over and capitulate. That didn’t happen. The majority of Ukraine will emerge independent, free to rebuild itself as a prosperous democracy. That’s a credit to the Ukrainian people’s heroism.”
• President Putin:
“We wanted to stop Ukraine joining NATO, housing US long-range missiles and foreign military bases on its territory, and to get protections for Russian language and culture. We got it.”
• President Zelensky:
“We have a real Western security guarantee – for the first time in our country’s history. And we’re going to become an ‘EU Bridge’ member.”
A win for everyone.
10/ Peacekeeping troops
• United Nations troops should man the border – the only neutral peacekeepers that Russia is likely to accept.
• UN peacekeepers paid for NOT from the main UN budget (of which the US pays an outsized 25–27%). General Kellogg thankfully has the answer, writing with Fred Fleitz in April 2024: “We also call for placing levies on Russian energy sales to pay for Ukrainian reconstruction.” Extend this very good idea to specially fund neutral peacekeepers.
• A moderate resumption of Russian energy to Europe can finance peacekeepers, discharging talk of “a deal with the devil” (on energy) as European media (The Economist) presently puts it.
• Ask Erik Prince to propose a zero-bloat troop number and configuration.
• A sensible amount of Russian energy supply with a levy would bring down European energy costs, keep American LNG prices competitive, and help curtail the risk of a rebound in US inflation.
• European countries will not get to spending +2.5% on defense sustainably (as is needed) without cheaper, diversified energy supply. And following the announcement of Stargate, the US will need more of its own energy at home, to power its colossal build out of AI data-centres.
11/ So:
—> The US to lift sanctions on Russia
—> Russia to resume moderate energy supply to Europe
—> A small levy on this energy supply to pay for neutral UN peacekeepers (and Ukraine’s reconstruction)
—> Europe commits to vastly increasing its defense spending (with more affordable energy).
Wins for every party.
12/ In closing
I’m rooting strongly for the Trump administration’s diplomatic success.
I believe it can still be done. History from Eisenhower shows that it can.
But attempts thus far have been wanting. Progress has not been near rapid enough. And time is running out.
Here’s what Eisenhower’s biographer, Stephen E. Ambrose, wrote about the Korean Armistice finally being secured, July 27th 1953 (188 days into Eisenhower’s term):
“There were no victory celebrations, no cheering crowds in Times Square, no sense of triumph. Instead Republicans like Jenner, Dewey Short, McCarthy, and House Speaker Joe Martin complained because the Administration had not sought victory, while Lyndon Johnson warned that the armistice ‘merely releases aggressive armies to attack elsewhere’.
The armistice was, despite its reception, one of Eisenhower’s greatest achievements. He took great pride in it. Despite intense opposition from his own party, from his Secretary of State [John Foster Dulles], and from Syngman Rhee [President of South Korea], he had ended the war six months after taking office. Eisenhower [was] the only American who could have found and made stick what he called ‘an acceptable solution to a problem that almost defied solution’.”
The above is my best attempt to compose a plan that could elevate President Trump into the league of such company. (Research help from: Sang-Hwa Lee, Se Taylor and Catherine Hervieu.)
Is President Trump ready to pivot from an approach that isn’t working – as Eisenhower, four months in, had the courage to do?
“What stands out is Eisenhower the leader. The Supreme Allied Commander of 1945, the victor who would [in 1945] accept nothing less than unconditional surrender, had become the peacemaker of 1953... Eisenhower realized that unlimited war in the nuclear age was unimaginable, and limited war unwinnable.”
All critique/ire welcome. End 🧵
PS. Lindsey Graham’s sanctions plan = disaster.
Sanctioning India and other neutral countries (which is Lindsey Graham’s plan) will only further drive should-be allies MORE into the arms of Russia + China.