How European robotics supply chains could get an infusion 💶
If you can hold four ideas in your head at the same time, you can see the opportunity.
1) The EU crafting a new (ill thought-through) scheme to tap frozen Russian assets for Ukraine.
2) A Russian concession – forgotten by most: they did make one. An important Reuters article from February:
“Russia could agree to using $300 billion of sovereign assets frozen in Europe for reconstruction in Ukraine but will insist that part of the money is spent on the one-fifth of the country that Moscow’s forces control, three sources told Reuters... While the freezing of the funds has angered Moscow, some of Russia’s most outspoken war hawks have previously acknowledged Russia may eventually part with the frozen reserves, provided that the controlled territories stay within Russia.”
3) Sir Niall Ferguson gave an interview while in Kyiv last week: “I’ve argued here at the Yalta European Strategy conference that we need an Operation Warp Speed for German rearmament.”
4) Marc Andreessen on US robotics, in conversation with Peter Robinson in January:
Marc: “The big industry that follows phones, drones and cars, logically, is: robots. We are on the verge of the robotics revolution we have all seen in science fiction.”
Peter: “And the Chinese are ahead of us there?”
Marc: “Oh, 100%. Now, we have the leading R&D. I’m convinced we have the smartest robotics and AI people – specifically for the design of systems. But we don’t have anything resembling the manufacturing capability at all. It’s not just whether a company can build a robot; it’s whether you have the thousands of companies that make all of the components that go into robots.”
How could these ideas be blended, for maximum Western advantage?
Ukraine is now the most heavily mined country in the world. Agricultural exports from Ukraine are estimated to be $8.9bn lower per year due to landmines (affecting the food security of many African countries), while regional tax revenues are $1.1 billion lesser.
De-mining the territory is projected by the Tony Blair Institute to take ten+ years, and a World Bank estimate: cost $34bn. (Adjusted for inflation, the Manhattan Project cost only $30bn over the course of World War II.)
I’ve argued since June: Is there an opportunity for the Trump Administration, in partnership with the EU, to commission the most innovative Western robotics companies: Anduril, Boston Dynamics, Optimus/Tesla, Gecko Robotics, Foundation, as well as lesser-known European equivalents, and emulate the tender process of Operation Warp Speed?
Instead of leaving de-mining to NGOs, task the private sector, and use the problem of landmines as an opportunity to get Western robotics supply chains in gear.
At the All-In Summit two weeks ago, on the way to the final evening’s party, I met (in attendance) a US military veteran who’s now COO of a California-based robotics company. Putting my suggestion to him, his reply:
“Making a treasure hunt to de-mine Ukraine strikes me as a brilliant idea. I think a ton of impressive companies would get really into that. It’s the same kind of incentive structure that makes Bitcoin miners an option.”
Could frozen Russian cash be used as a prize to stimulate Western robotics? Every mine a robot of yours defuses = $/€ cash prize. Robotics companies from any Western countries can enter.
I consider strongly that Russia’s frozen assets should not be used for lethal aid to Ukraine, and military escalation. The optics of this would surely get European banks into hot water, and Belgium is rightly guarded. We should also note: if the EU were to use the frozen funds to continue the war, there will be no funding pot left to finance ultimate reconstruction.
But, a humanitarian, non-lethal call for de-mining the territory feels to me altogether different. Presentation of this matters on the international stage.
That Reuters piece from February again:
“Russia could agree to using $300 billion of sovereign assets frozen in Europe for reconstruction in Ukraine but will insist that part of the money is spent on the one-fifth of the country that Moscow’s forces control, three sources told Reuters.”
Could there be a deal to be made here?
Newly created robotics manufacturing capacity would of course have future dual-use potential. Marc Andreessen: “Everything we’ve just been talking about [on civilian robotics] is also upstream from all of the military applications. It’s that same supply chain that then goes into everything we talked about.”
But the release of frozen Russian funds should, I suggest, be confined specifically to non-lethal de-mining and reconstruction. (I’d actually go further and say: if the funds can’t be used for Ukraine’s military aid, with Belgium continuing to resist; and they’re surely never going to be given back to Russia; the only thing the funds are good for is de-mining and reconstruction.)
Sir Niall in the same interview last week:
“A much more coherent response to the nature of the war that we face [is needed]. I worry that European Generals want to rearm for the war of the 1990s. That’s to say, they’re going to invest in hardware that is obsolete. The war of the future is overwhelmingly a drone war, in which autonomous systems, AI and satellite communications will be crucial. And the Europeans have a long way to go to be competitive with the US in those domains.”
If EU bureaucrats grant themselves the authority to spend $300bn however they like to try and help Ukraine, they will, quite possibly, squander it on past-century relics.
But being straitjacketed (some gentle US assistance) to build agile de-mining robots could instead put European manufacturing in a stronger long-term position. It would get funding to startups, not 20th century primes.
Professor Michael Clarke, by far the best defence analyst I’ve seen regularly on British television, yesterday:
“Looking at the end of this month, a Ukrainian delegation is due in Washington to talk to American industrialists about joint production. Americans are getting interested in helping Ukrainians scale up their innovation production [of drones]… A lot of American entrepreneurs are getting interested in that.”
In stark contrast to the simmering EU scheme (that’s fatally flawed – see comments section below for more), it’s in Russia’s self-interest that the occupied territory gets de-mined.
And an agreement here would unlock the potential of the April-signed US-Ukraine minerals deal. (The shared reconstruction-investment fund to which Ukraine will give half its revenues from future mineral extraction to the US.) If robots can defuse landmines, can they go on to assist with mineral-mining, too? Mining-robotics joint ventures await.
Territorial concessions still need to be made – yes. But there are other creative suggestions there.
The money’s there. Lots of it. And someone’s going to do something with it.
Perhaps de-mining robots are something American industrialists should discuss?



A further Q&A on this idea...
1) Can you concisely describe the present EU scheme?
The new EU scheme = using Russia’s frozen funds to buy zero interest EU bonds. It seems to me like a fudge. From a Financial Times piece on it:
“[The] reparation loans idea, saying it would only need to be repaid if Russia agreed to compensate Kyiv for invasion damage [surely that’s not going to happen]...
The use of EU bonds would require EU member states to guarantee the loans. ‘The risk will have to be carried collectively,’ von der Leyen said during her announcement last week, in a nod to Belgium’s concerns about being found liable in any litigation launched by Russia.
Issuing long-term bonds backed by Russian assets would require guarantees that the sanctions regime would stay in place for the duration of the loan, one person said.”
It’s precisely the kind of thing you’d imagine the EU would dream up. Of course: anything that’s hailed as “legally creative” should be avoided. They’re right: the money is there to do something. But their application of how and mechanism by which to use it is typical EU.
2) Could Russia really go along with this thinking?
Hawks in Russia came close in February 2025 to agreeing that the funds be given to Ukraine in exchange for the territory. (Despite President Trump’s Tuesday post, this is probably not going to budge in Ukraine’s favor.)
Robots don’t necessarily need to be used for de-mining on the Russian side of the border – which could surely be a security concern. But frozen funds could still be allocated to Western robotics companies to clear the land Ukraine continues to hold.
3) Why should America care?
The Biden administration, having provided cluster munitions and American anti-personnel landmines, contributed to this problem.
The US newly beginning to advocate for the frozen funds being used for de-mining (rather than Europe effectively taking the funds and escalating) might be internationally lauded, and produce massive gratitude towards President Trump. It would help food security in Africa.
Is there an opportunity here: clear the ground, stimulate innovative US and European robotics companies, and re-demonstrate to the world what US industry can do?
And not much can come from the April-signed minerals agreement without this. (Though, some of the richest deposits are in areas occupied by Russia.)
4) Could this money be used as negotiating leverage?
Yes, definitely. A rough sketch of deal terms that factor this in could be:
i) Territory agreed on the line of contact as it now is
ii) Russia, take the territory you have – and let’s stop fighting
iii) We (the West) are going to take the frozen ~$300bn
iv) And we agree – as suggested in February – part of the funds can be used to de-mine all contested territory.
Also say to Russia: If you do not agree to this, we’re going to release the funds for lethal aid to Ukraine. Which do you want? And mean it. “If you invade a European country and take their land, we’re going to take your frozen assets” is not the worst precedent to set.
Providing Russia a fair chance to agree to the funds being used for de-mining could win over reluctant Belgium (and Germany and France) if Russia declines.
5) What would Ukraine get?
Its territory de-mined, and a huge amount of funding unlocked for reconstruction.
6) What about security guarantees?
Maybe this – US private industry – is the security guarantee. When President Trump first floated such back in February, it didn’t seem plausible (in Europe). But that was an earlier world: many European countries still struggling to hit 2% on defence.
With NATO consensus now seemingly buoyant at 5%, the argument President Trump made back in February (US industry and mineral-mining being the best security guarantee) might better land. Combined with Europe radically stepping up its military spending, the combination could be enough. (Or the best Ukraine is likely to get.)
7) What about winter?
Yes, there would be winter weather challenges. Even the most cutting-edge robots would, I’m sure, be challenged to find mines through the ice five months of the year. But could an agreement be negotiated now – ramping up manufacturing capacity to be ready March/April time, so when the ice has thawed, it’s non-lethal de-mining robots, not death-dealing equivalents, being sent back across the divide?